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especial purpose of releasing Holland from French control, and urged that inducements in the way of additional territory must be offered to Prussia. This did not please Czartoryski, who urged rather that threats should be addressed to Prussia to compel her aid. Unquestionably it is possible to read in Czartoryski's plan a desire to destroy Prussian greatness and to pave the way for a restoration of Polish importance. Thus these despatches furnish additional proof of Czartoryski's patriotic ideas of a regenerated Poland. The wishes of the English government carried the day, however, and offers were made to Prussia. Yet these were so restricted by Russian jealousy as to constitute no sufficient inducement at the time. Other points of interest are Russia's desire and England's unwillingness that Spain be included in the coalition, Russia's indifference to the fate of Sardinia (not her customary attitude), an agreement that Holland and Belgium be united in one kingdom, a total indifference to the cause of Louis XVIII, and the avowed determination not to interfere in any way in the internal government of France.

The Russian despatches cover the period from April 27, 1804, to August 14, 1805. Mr. Rose next gives us the despatches beginning October 27, 1805, detailing Lord Harrowby's mission to Berlin. The chief interest here is with Hardenberg's well-known assertion that Harrowby offered Holland to Prussia as a bribe to induce Prussia to join the coalition, and in the secret Russo-Prussian agreement that Prussia should have Hanover. As to the former, Harrowby's despatches show that he proposed the temporary occupation of Holland by Prussia, and nothing more, while on the question of the cession of Hanover the English government, as soon as it was aware of the plan, instructed Harrowby to take the ground that he could in no way discuss it as he was an English and not a Hanoverian diplomat. England, quite evidently, did not think anything would result from such a plan but was quite willing that Russia should hold out this bribe or any other, if only it would result in Prussia's active participation in the war. Moreover this Russian plan for the aggrandizement of Prussia evidently seemed to England to have the advantage of committing Russia to the policy of offering increase of territory to Prussia, and this might now well be urged on the eastern instead of the western boundary. But with the news of Austerlitz all negotiations soon ceased, the last despatch in the volume bearing date of December 13, 1805.

E. D. ADAMS.

*Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I.* Von THEODOR SCHIEMANN. Band I. *Kaiser Alexander I. und die Ergebnisse seiner Lebensarbeit.* (Berlin: Georg Reimer. 1904. Pp. x, 637.)

THE time has perhaps come when it is possible to write a full and reasonably impartial life of Nicholas I of Russia, the sovereign who prided himself on being not only the guardian of law and order, of religion and established principles, but also the first gentleman of

Europe. On the other hand, to millions he was the hateful embodiment of all that was most brutal in an unlimited despotism, a cruel tyranny supported by only a huge army and a base, corrupt bureaucracy. Outside of Russia his memory has met with but little sympathy. In his own country the opinion held of him may be taken as an excellent touchstone of a man's political principles at the present day.

For better or for worse Nicholas during many years almost dominated Europe; and the story of his aims and achievements, of his extraordinary successes and his final disastrous failure, is well worth the telling. His recent biography by General Schilder suffers from the limitations which censorship rules impose on a Russian author who writes of comparatively recent political events. Also, the work has not been translated, and after two sumptuous volumes has by the death of the author been brought to a premature end with the year 1830. In western languages we have nothing of consequence except the eight volumes of the French life of the emperor by Paul Lacroix; but, besides being superficial and out of date, it too is unfinished, not getting beyond 1841. A satisfactory study of him is yet to be written.

Of living foreign scholars Professor Schieman is probably the one best fitted for such an undertaking. From Reval in the Russian Baltic provinces he was called to the University of Berlin, where he has distinguished himself by notable work on Slavic history. His present task is one to which he evidently intends to do justice, as is shown by the fact that in five hundred closely printed pages (not counting the valuable appendixes) he does not reach the subject of his title. This his first volume is, as is announced by a second title-page, a history of the reign and character of Alexander I. Nicholas appears in it but little; indeed there is only one chapter devoted to him. The book deals more particularly with the career and the character of Alexander, his relations with his father, the story of his violent accession to the throne, and the affairs of his long reign.

Not even five hundred pages could do more than scant justice to so extensive a subject. Professor Schieman has done wisely in restricting his efforts to certain aspects of it. So far at least, his work is not a military history, hence he does not take up the tale of the many campaigns of the Russian armies between 1803 and 1826, nor does he enter into competition with Vandal by describing at length the diplomatic relations between Alexander and Napoleon. The doings of the Holy Alliance are likewise disposed of in the briefest possible manner. For many details in this connection the writer would probably refer us to Bernhardi, *Geschichte Russlands*. On the other hand Alexander's diplomacy in the Eastern question comes in for a hundred pages; his relations with the Poles are given as much more; and half of the rest of the volume is devoted to the internal affairs of Russia during his reign. Everywhere we find the same care on the part of the author in collecting, sifting, and making use of his facts. It is true that at times

we may wish for a little more warmth on his part—his book is not light reading—and we may feel that if he were capable of more sympathy for the persons he describes, his views of them would perhaps be fairer; still his judgment is always sane. When, in his last page of all, he sums up the strength and weakness of the emperor whom he has taken such pains in describing, even if the characterization is not artistically brilliant, it is convincing as being the opinion of a sound and thoughtful scholar. We look forward with much interest to the continuation of the work.

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE.

*The True Henry Clay.* By JOSEPH M. ROGERS. (Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1904. Pp. 388.)

MR. ROGERS, as the other authors of the "True" series, starts out with the purpose of employing the odds and ends of material which discriminating historians have rejected as unimportant, in order to reverse popular judgments, which are, in large matters, generally correct. He is, however, too good a Kentuckian really to diminish Clay's shadow, and precisely in this local setting lies the peculiar value of his book.

The topical method prescribed for the series is less felt to be a disadvantage in this than in some of the other lives, for Clay was one of those precocious men who flash in full brilliancy upon their contemporaries. Moreover, Mr. Rogers uses his method with freedom, so that although we continually shift backward and forward, we nevertheless make progress from chapter to chapter; gradually becoming aware that, though Clay's mind did not develop, his information increased and his character grew. The loose, rambling, repetitious style, running at times even into errors of grammar, informs us at once that we are not to look here for the minor accuracies of scholarship. Nor are all the errors minor. It is an inexcusable mistake to attribute to Clay the Missouri compromise line of  $36^{\circ} 30'$  (p. 238); Clay was more enthusiastic than Adams over the Panama Congress (p. 139); the sturdy descendants of Calhoun will view with surprise the statement that "if Calhoun had been blessed with a wife and children, the history of the country might have been very different" (p. 249). Nor is the lack of precision absolved by much contribution of new material. The book seems to have been written mainly from Colton's *Clay*, Adams's *Memoirs*, and Benton's *Thirty Years' View*, supplemented by a large personal knowledge derived from the press and from tradition. The author had access to certain Clay manuscripts, but their importance is not great. He has not the historical training to enable him to adjudge the value of this material, and the plan of the series forbids foot-notes; but he has met these disadvantages by giving in the text the sources of most new statements, and so allowing the reader to make an individual judgment. The absence of a good index is not serious in a book which cannot be used for reference, and whose value depends upon being read as a whole.